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Covert Speech Acts and their Meaning
Salvatore Attardo
This paper defines a class of speech acts
which have as one of their felicity conditions
that the hearer not be aware of the speaker's
intention to achieve the speech act in
question. Examples of these speech acts are
"insinuate," "flatter," "brainwash," etc.
These speech acts differ both from explicit
assertives, such as "say" or "affinn," and
from implicit assertives, such as "hint,"
"allude," "imply," "suggest," etc. Covert
speech acts share with implicit assertives the
fact that they cannot explicitly state the
propositional content of the assertion, but
they differ in that implicit assertives can be
overt. The analysis of covert speech acts
will allow us to determine the general
conditions for this class of speech acts.
Finally, we will tum to considering the
implications of our definition for the
intentionality-based theories of meaning and
in particular for Grice's MeaningNN and
Relevance Theory CRT), and especially the
problem that covert speech acts present for
the so-called "communicative intention"
(Sperber and Wilson 1986), which stipulates
that communication (and cooperation)
presuppose overtness in communication. In
fact, our conclusion will be that the category
of covert communication proves to be highly
problematic for theories based on
communicative intention and that in any
case, the very category of covert
communication needs to be radically
reconsidered.
We will approach the issue from two
different ends: deductively and inductively,
i.e., starting from the theory and starting
from the data.

1

Covert Communication

It will be useful to begin our discussion by

quoting Grice's definition ofMeaningNN in a
slightly streamlined version.
(1) S intends the utterance of u to produce in
H an effect by means ofH's recognition
of SIS intention (Grice 1957, 442).
The recognition of SIS intention by H is
called the "reflexive intention" (Searle 1969:
47).
The significance of Grice's definition
will become apparent further on, but for the
time being, we can tum our attention to the
definition of covert communication. Covert
communication has received comparatively
less attention than overt communication, of
which Grice's definition is a prime example.
One definition comes from Tanaka (1994):
(2) A case of communication where the
intention of the speaker is to alter the
cognitive environment of the hearer, i.e.,
to make a set of assumptions more
manifest to her, without making this
intention mutually manifest (41).
Making a set of assumptions manifest is RT
terminology for having an effect on H, and
making an intention mutually manifest is RT
for reflexive intention.
F or our purposes, we can essentially
accept the above definition by noting that
covert communication is simply
communication in which S does not want H
to become aware of SIS intention to
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communicate the meaning attached to u,
which we will indicate by p.l

1.1

A formal definition

We may, however, provide a more formal
definition by making use of the concept of
goals (Attardo 1997). Castelfranchi and
Parisi (1980:328; see below, note 5) define a
class of linguistic acts in which the
"supergoal" is different than the immediate
goal. In the terminology introduced in
Attardo (1997), this is equivalent to
claiming that S has a goal (G) that is
different than the subgoal (g,,) for which the
utterance is produced. In overt
communication, one of the sub goals of G is
the reflexive intention, which we may label
gr whereas in covert communication such as
a sub goal is explicitly excluded. If we
consider G as a set of its subgoals 2 , we have

and

1.2 Beyond the reflexive
intention
The reflexive intention as postulated by
Grice is in need of some elaboration.
Specifically, we identify two possibilities:
one which, as per Grice, S intends or does
not intend for H to be aware of p, and the
other in which S intends or does not intend
for H to be aware of p, and the other in
which S intends or does not intend for H to
be aware of p. In other words, we are
claiming that the two aspects ofreflexiv
intention (the overtness of S's intention and
the content of the intention, namely that H
be aware) are independent and can be
arranged in a two by two, as follows (the
numbers refer to the examples in Table 1).

H is aware

H is not aware

overt

3,4

7

covert

5,6

8

Table 1
In other words, it is possible for S to intend
that H be aware ofp and that H be aware of
S's intention. But it is also possible for S to
intend that H not be aware of p, and the
other in which S intends or does not intend
for H not to be aware of p and that H be
aware ofS's intention. Conversely, it is
possible for S not to intend that H be aware
ofp and that H not be aware ofS's intention,
as well as for S not to intend that H be aware
ofp and to intend that H be aware ofS's
intention.
Another way to conceptualize this
maze of positive and negative intention is
Communication © is overt iff S intends for
H to be aware that S intends H to ± be aware
of S' s intention.

1.3

Examples

Communication is overt if S 's intention that
H be aware ofp.
(3) If S wants to be aware that S has read
Das Kapital, any utterance that can be
paraphrased can be paraphrased as "I
have read Das Kapital" is acceptable.
(4) In the same situation, any indirect
reference to the above paraphrase that
would presuppose that the speaker has
read Das Kapital, such as "The theory of
plus-value is fascinating reading," IS
acceptable.
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Communication is covert if S does not
intend for H to be aware of S 's intention for
H to be aware of p.

member of the audience who does not speak
French and / or has not read Rimbaud's
letters.

(5) Your wife has been out with Bob quite
often recently (Bertuccelli Papi
1996:198).

2

Example (5) insinuates that "the wife in
question has betrayed the husband/listener
with a certain Bob" (Ibid.).
(6) Dear Dr. Attardo, I have the honor to
write to an eminent scholar such as you (
... ) I am very much impressed by your
ideas and genius ( ... ) (personal
communication by an Iraqi colleague
asking for reprints)
In example (6), S's intent is to please H by
attributing him positive qualifications. This
is a prime example of failed flattery
(because H became aware ofS's intent).
Communication is overt if the
speaker intends for H to be aware of S' s
intention for H not to be aware of p.
(7) I know what you're getting for your
birthday, but I'm not telling.
In example (7), S is privy to p and knows
that H is not aware of p, mentions this to H,
and yet refuses to share p.
Communication is covert if S does
not intend for H to be aware ofS's
intention for H not to understand p.
(8) Rimbaud's Je est un autre brilliantly
summarizes a poetics of self-alienation.
In (8), a hypothetical French literature
professor deliberately speaks
condescendingly above the head of any

Inductive Approach

We can approach the issues of covert
communication inductively, so to speak, by
looking at different speech acts and trying to
differentiate among them. Let us assume, as
we have done above, that p stands for some
knowledge (propositional or not) that Sand
H mayor may not have, independently of
one another. Thus, if utterance u
conventionally means p, saying p (i.e.,
uttering u) means to state explicitly this bit
of knowledge. Therefore, in what follows
we will simplify the discussion by using
"saying p" to mean "uttering u, which
conventionally means p."

2.01. Hinting
Let us now compare saying and hinting: the
difference between the two is that, whereas
in saying S explicitly says p, in hinting S
cannot state p, but must provide H with
"clues" that will lead H to knowing that S
meant to communicate p (and hence also
knowing that p is the case in S' s mind 3 )
Parret (1993:232) defines hinting as
to overtly display one's intention
to let [H] know that the proposition
expressed contains information that will
allow [H] to find an answer to the
problem he[/she] is facing, assuming that
[H] has access to additional information.
(... ) the act of hinting, moreover, uses
conventional means, which are accepted
by all language users and make sure that
the act is easily detectable and clearly
recognizable.

,
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It should be noted that hinting is an overt
speech act. Hinting differs from suggesting

since, according to Parret (Ibid.), S is
committed to the truth of what one hints at,
whereas one is only committed to the "likely
truth" of one's suggestion. There seems to
be no reason to question this perceptive
analysis. There seems to be no reason to
question this perceptive analysis. We could,
however, add this add that suggestions can
also take the form of explicitly saying that p,
i.e., one can say "I suggest that p," whereas
one cannot say "I hint thatp."
Hinting does not differ from
implying, insofar as they both presuppose
that S not say p. However, hinting differs
from implying: basically, a hint requires
explicit clues to H that the meaning hinted
as is. Implying may be done without any
explicit, let alone thematized, clues.

2.02 Suggesting
Suggesting is similar to hinting, insofar as
both verbs require that one not explicitly say
p. An interesting difference between
suggesting and hinting is revealed by
Vanderveken (1990: 172), who notes that

to suggest something is to bring it to of
the mind of the hearer without
necessarily explicitly affirming it
andwithout a strong commitment to its
truth.
Vanderveken's position is incorrect insofar
as he seems to be arguing that one can
explicitly affirm something and be
suggesting, but he is undeniably right in
claiming that S is not committed as strongly
to the truth of a suggestion as one is to the
truth of a hint (cf. also Searle and
Vanderveken 1985:187). Suppose that a

205

teacher put in one ofthe questions of the
final exam of one of his/her classes a hint
that would tum out to be wrong; the students
would rightly be upset. However, they
would have much less reason to do so if
he/she had suggested the same.
Let us return for an instant to the
claim that one can say p and still be
suggesting. Vanderveken notes that this is a
lent credence by the fact that "suggest" can
be used performatively (i.e., its utterance
causes the situation described in the verb to
be the case, e.g., baptize, check-mate, etc.),
as in the following example:
(9) I suggest you are in error (Vanderveken
1990:172).
Consider that in (9) S has said p and
therefore can hardly be suggesting it.
Therefore, such uses are likely to be
metaphorical and meant more as face-saving
techniques: to say that one suggests p would
be equivalent of saying "I weakly say that
p." The face-saving aspect of such a use
relies on the difference in strength of the
assertion,
already noted in Searle and Vanderveken
(1985:187).

2.0.3 Insinuating
Hinting differs from· insinuating in that,
whereas H is aware of S 's intention to hint,
H must not be aware of S' s intention when S
insinuates. On the difference between
hinting and insinuating, see Holdcroft
(1978:61-63), who distinguishes between
them on the grounds that one must not
"intend to conceal the fact that this is what
one is trying to do" (62), as is the case in
insinuating, "an essentially covert act"
(Ibid.). Parret (1933:233) concurs:
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INSINUATION, just like manipulation,
cannot come about openly and explicitly:
[S] cannot reveal his[lher] intentions by
adding, for instance, the performati ve
prefix "I am insinuating". (. . .)
insinuation is an attempt by [S] to make
something understood to [H], even if
covertly so. The act of insinuation
seems to take place when [S] wants [H]
to know that p, without [S} wanting [H}
to judge that [S] wanted him[lher] to
know that p.
Parret argues that one need not necessarily
insinuate something "reprehensible," and
therefore that it is not the reason for not
wanting to explicitly say p. His example is
that of a doctor trying to insinuate to a
patient that he/she should go on a diet.
Bertuccelli-Papi (1996:197) claims that, on
the contrary, insinuating necessarily implies
a negative emotive or evaluative "attitude"
ofH towards p. She argues that in Parret's
example
what is being insinuated is not the advice
itself, but on the contrary the indirect
charge of being too fat, which is
generally accompanied by a negative
ATT[itude]
(Ibid.).
What is, then, the correct position? It seems
that the reason S insinuates p is the fact that
he/she believes that something bad4 may
happen as a result of his/her sayingp, while
S still wants to make p known. If this
general premisse to S's goals in insinuating
is correct, then it follows that the negative
evaluation or reprehensibility of p is not a
necessary and sufficient condition for
compelling S' s choice of speech act.

Basically, any time that S fears
consequences of his/her saying p, regardless
of the nature of p, he/she may opt for
insinuating p.
Consider Grice's well-known
example of a professor writing a letter of
recommendation of a less-than-brilliant
student. In today's litigation-happy
environment, one may be understandably
wary of saying out-and-out that one thinks
that a given student is not worthy of a job
(=p). Therefore, one may choose to
insinuate this idea. Note that neither S nor
H have any great emotional/evaluative
investment in this fact. If anything, S would
be ashamed of having had such a student,
but H would be completely unconcerned
about S sayingp, and in fact would welcome
S explicitly saying so because it would not
require any processing and would lead to the
consideration of other candidates, or
whatever other perlocutionary effects S
saying p would have.

2.0.4 Flattering
Insinuating and flattering pattern together, in
requiring that the intention of S to
accomplish the speech act has to be kept
covert for this goal to succeed. Conversely,
hinting and alluding have no such
requirement. Flattering is, of course, a fairly
complex speech act, but it has been analyzed
brilliantly by Castelfranchi and Parisi
(1980).5 It breaks down into two goals -- an
immediate sub goal, which is to provide H
with a positive evaluation of his/her person,
behavior, etc., and an ultimate goal, which is
to achieve some benefit (most likely from H)
Commonly, it is taken for granted
that when S flatters H, S does not believe p.
However, this is partially in error. One can
flatter by sayingp, while believing p to be
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true (c.f. Verschueren 1985:124). Suppose
that S introduces Noam Chomsky, who is
about to address an audience by saying
"Professor Chomsky is the most influential
living linguist," and assume that Noam
Chomsky believes that the above utterance
is, if not true, reasonably close to the truth;
assume further that S wants to reap some
benefit by so introducing Chomsky (i.e., that
Chomsky like him/her). Then whether S
believes p to be true or false is immaterial,
since the perlocutionary effect of flattering
will be achieved. Obviously, one could
argue that in the case that S believes p to be
true, he/she incidentally flatters H, whereas
S deliberately flatters H iff S believes p to be
false; but at this point the issue seems
definitional.
Finally, let me point out that, in
order to be successful, flattery must be
reasonably close to what H believes to be
the truth, as example (6) shows: by
addressing this writer as a genius, S fails to
successfully flatter, since H does not believe
p to be reasonably true, and hence cannot
believe S does. 6

Perri (1978) treats allusion as a case of
intertextuality, which could constitute
grounds for distinguishing between allusion
and hinting, since the latter is not
intertextual. However, it seems to me that
one can very well allude at something
besides another text.

2.0.6 Manipulation and
seduction
Parret (1993) analyzes manipulation and
seduction, and as can be gathered from the
quote mentioned above, sees manipulation
as a covert act, whereas he sees seduction as
an act that flaunts itself ("seduction
presupposes the stageing and dramatization
of the secret" 231). It is hard to follow
Parret's point, especially when he denies the
intentionality of the seducer (Ibid.).
Seduction is a subclass of manipulation, at
least when it is not confused with winning
someone over. The latter may be admitted
to, the former cannot. 7 We will, however,
pursue this issue not further.

2.07 Lies
2.0.5 Allusion
Allusion shares with flattering, insinuating,
and hinting the requirement that it not say
explicitly p (see Perri 1978:92). Consider
the ill-formedness of the following
examples:
(10) *Mary alluded to John by pointing at
him and saying "John, over there."
As pointed out above, allusions and hints are
overt (i.e., S wants H to recognize his/her
intention to refer (indirectly) to p). It is not
clear that at the level that concerns us there
is a difference between hinting and alluding.

This is not the place to sum up the literature
on lies, which is, moreover, mostly
concerned with the ethical aspects of the
issue, which need not detain us in this
context (see a review in Robinson 1996).
The most famous treatment of lies is
Coleman and Kay's (1981:28), which can be
summed up in the following three aspects:
1. S believes p to be false
2. In saying p, S intends to deceive
H

3. P is false
which basically encode a "folk" view of lies
(see Sweetser 1987). However, it can be
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shown that points 1 and 3 do not hold.
Consider the following definition of lies,
from Rasking (1987:459):
LIE (S, H, p) = (3 q)(BELIEVE (S, FALSE
(q) & p ::J q)),
which may be paraphrased as
A lie has three arguments -- S, H, and p - and consists of the following
specifications: there is a proposition q
such that S believes q to be false and S
believes that p implies q
or, in other words, S can lie by saying p if
he/she believes that by sayingp he/she will
make H infer that q, assuming that S
believes q to be false. 8 The somewhat
startling consequence of this point is that
one may lie by telling the literal truth while
one believes it to be true (contra point 1
above). Note that this is different from the
(relatively uninteresting) fact that one may
lie by uttering p while p is true, but S
mistakenly believes that p is false. This
invalidates point 3 above: lies are
exclusively a matter of S' s beliefs; the
objective truth of p is irrelevant.
Consider Raskin's example, here
augmented by answer (iii):
(11) Q: Are Jack and Jill having an affair?
Ai: No (direct lie).
Aii: They are both too busy for that.
(indirect lie)
Aiii: Yes, they are having sex every
hour on the hour.
Assume that the respondent knows that Jack
and Jill are having an affair. Answer (I) is
the paradigmatic case of a lie and answer (ii)
is an indirect lie because the utterance of the

sentence "They are both too busy for that"
implies, "therefore they are too busy for
having an affair." Answer (iii) is the
statement of truth, enriched by the
(relatively obvious) exaggeration concerning
the frequency of their extramarital
encounters. S can utter (iii) with the
reasonable expectations that H will detect
the violation of the CP in the second part of
the sentence and will extend it to the first
part. The absurdity of the second part of the
utterance can obviously be reinforced by
intonation and appropriate proxemic
behavior (e.g., rolling the eyes, smiling,
winking, etc.).
Examples of this kind of lie are more
frequent than one would believe: in the
movie Don't Tell Mom the Babysitter's
Dead, a teenager tells his mother on the
phone that he and his sister are having a wild
party and the sister is about to leave with her
boyfriend. The mother assumes, naturally,
that her son is joking (since it would be very
stupid to tell one's mother that one is
disobeying her orders about not having
parties or going out with boyfriends). In one
episode of the sitcom Cybill, the main
character is reconciling with her former
husband; as they are about to have sex, the
main character's daughters, a friend
(Marianne), and the other husband arrive
and knock at the door. The former husband
hides in the closet. After a brief dialogue,
Cybill ushers everybody out. While leaving,
Marianne asks "Really, what were you
doing?" and the following dialogue ensues.
(12) Cybill: "Oh, OK, my former husband is
hiding naked in the closet."
Marianne: "Fine, don't tell me."
Other examples can be found in Ekman
(1985[1992]: 37-38).
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of p. Let us recall that this is what has been
called "reflexive intention." Therefore, the
above analysis is perfectly in line with
Tanaka's definition of covert
communication above.
We can therefore define a bit more
formally a class of "covert speech acts" such
that one of the subgoals of S in performing
that speech act is that H be unaware that S is
performing that speech act. Perhaps more
effectively, we can also define this class of
verbs as speech acts in which the reflexive
intention is absent.

2. 1 Summing up the discussion
The results of this discussion can be
summarized in a chart. The nested
intentions are represented by a predicate
calculus-like notation. We posit an intention
predicate (I) which takes two arguments, the
agent (who intends) and the object ofthe
intention, which has to be a predicate (and
can obviously be another intention
predicate). So Is(Ksh) would read as "the
speaker intends to kiss the hearer." "R"
stands for recognize, be aware of. Note that
because of predicate calculus' convention to
represent predicates in uppercases and
arguments in lowercase, we have to change
the notation used so far in the text, whereby
Sand H were in uppercase.
We can define the top three speech
acts in Table 2 (below) as overt, while the
bottom three are covert. Thus the criterion
for overtness is S' s intention for H to
recognize his/her intention for H to be aware
say p

2.11 Other Covert Speech Acts
Needless to say, the examples in Table 2 are
not the only examples of this class of covert
speech acts. We can list a few other covert
speech acts which seem to be variants of
others already discussed. The following
verbs, gathered through a cursory search in a
thesaurus, will give an idea of the number of
these verbs.
Is(Rhp)

Is(Rh(Is(Rhp)))

say

+

+

+

allude

-

+

+

hint

-

+

+

insinuate

-

+

-

lie

±

-

-

flatter

-

+

Table 2

It should be noted that we are not claiming

that in all instances these verbs presuppose
their covertness, but rather the much weaker
claim that in some situations they do. Of

course, for some of these the claim that they
always do is probably true, thus limiting
ourselves to examples not previously
discussed; this seems true of brainwash, put
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a bug in someone 's ear, and manipulate
someone's opinion.

Entice: "to allure, lead on" (Webster),
inveigle: "to lead on with deception"
(Ibid.), wheedle: "to entice by soft
words" (Ibid.), angle for something,
gaslight (after the movie starring Ingrid
Bergman), impress smn, move, sway,
bend, influence, win over, bring round,
bedazzle, convince9 , make smn see the
light, bring to reason, talk smn into,
bring smn around, win over, sell smn on,
jawbone, reassure, persuade, talk smn
Into smt, manipulate smn' s opinion,
propagandize, brainwash, indoctrinate,
instill, imply, intimate, suggest, infer,
hint, give to understand, insinuate, allude
to, put a bug in smn's ear, bamboozle,
hoodwink, seduce, tempt, lure,
emapture, enthrall, ensnare, entrap,
sweet-talk, discourage, dishearten,
dispirit, dampen smn's spirits,
intimidate, throw suspicion on smn (e.g.,
covertly incriminate)

3
Meaning and anti-reflexive
intentional verbs
It will be interesting at this point to return to

the definition of covertness presented in
Attardo (1997a:27), which is here
reproduced for the readers' convenience:
The overt or covert nature of the
symmetrical/asymmetrical status of the
exchange, concerns either the mutual
knowledge of the goals of the speakers
or their mutual knowledge of their
access to information. A situation will
be termed "covert" if either of the
participants has access to knowledge
(concerning the goals of the interaction

or the information which is relevant to
it) to which the other participant does
not have access and he/she keeps this
concealed from the other participant.
As we can see, the class of covert speech
acts that has been defined above is indeed a
special case of covert communication, in
which S happens to have a perlocutionary
goals, Gs (Attardo 1997b), which has as one
of its sub goals that Gs be kept hidden from
H. Since Grice's stipulation within the
definition of meaningNN that S' s intention
of making H aware of the intention to
communicate p be overt has been called the
"reflexive intention," we can label this class
of speech acts as having an anti-reflexive
intention.
We now tum to the philosophical
problem which anti-reflexive intentional
verbs (ARl-verbs, for short) bring up. In
short, ARl-verbs present a problem for the
meaningNNtheory, since as per Grice's
definition ofmeaningNN (which has not
been substantially altered by the further
specifications, c.f. Strawson 1964, Schiffer
1972, Grice 1989), it presupposes a reflexive
intention. Therefore, it would
counterintuitively follow that ARl-verbs are
meaningless!
Clearly, so we will examine some
strategies that a meaningNN semanticist
might want to use to overcome this problem.
It seems that the following strategies are
available:
1. deny the ARl analysis of the verbs;
2. concede that ARl-verbs do not
meanNN, but argue that they mean
naturally;

Covert Speech Acts
3. concede that ARI-verbs do not
meanNN, but argue that they mean
via conventional implicatures;
4. concede that ARI-verbs do not
meanNN, but argue that they mean
via conversational implicatures;
5. abandon or revise the meaningNN
theory (or at least expunge the
reflexive intention from within it)
'We will not consider strategy (1) until the
end of the discussion, since it seems quite
counterintuitive, although the
counterintuitiveness has different sources.
Strategies (3) and (4) are probably
strengthened by being considered together
(and possibly as hybrid strategies blending
aspects of each), and I will tum to those
next. We will not address point (5) directly
in this paper, as it would entail a discussion
too complex and far afield from the present
issues (but see Ziff 1967 and Searle 1969).

3.1 ARI-verbs as implicatureonly speech acts
Essentially, this approach to ARI-verbs
coinsists in saying that an S engages in one
of the speech acts that we have classified as
ARI-verb, he/she is not saying (meaningNN)
p, but rather he/she is implying
(conventionally or conversationally) p.
As it stands, this strategy could
work, since it gets rid of the problem of
meaning in ARI-verbs.
Let us consider an example of
insinuation:
(l3) "I wonder how John has been able to
solve those algebra problems."
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"He's been hanging out with Mary a lot
lately."
In (13), S is not saying that Mary has helped
John (or even that John has plagiarized
Mary's work), but he/she is insinuating it.
The insinuated meaning is arrived at
inferentially, i.e., it is am implicature.
While this is undeniably true, it has
the unwanted effect of establishing a chasm
between ARI-verbs and other speech acts,
such as alluding or hinting, which do not
have an ARI condition. It would follow that
in the following example,
(14) I know you've been wondering how
John has been able to solve those
algebra problems. Here's a hint: he's
been hanging out with Mary a lot lately.
which differs (in its relevant speech) from
(13) exclusively in the performative prefix
which qualifies it as a hint, a radically
different mode of meaning would be in
effect. This is clearly counterintuitive, since
(13) and (14) differ only in the presence of
the performative prefix, which does not alter
the semantics of the sentence.
This difficulty can be avoided at the
price of denying the availability of
meaningNN to all non-explicit speech-act
verbs. In other words, when hinting,
alluding, insinuating, etc., S does not mean
p, but implies it. S would mean some
accessory meaning that is used to guide the
implicature.
However, one could argue against
this solution on the basis of the fact that if an
ARI-verb does not have a literal meaning, it
cannot generate implicatures. This seems to
confuse the issue somewhat. When S
insinuates in (13), he/she does so by saying
the literal meaning of(l3) (i.e., stating (13))
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and assuming that H will be able to infer the
insinuated meaning. So there is a literal
meaning in an allusion/insinuation, etc.,
except it is not the content of the
allusion/insinuation, etc.
There is a residual problem,
however, in those theories which make the
RI the foundation of meaning. In order to
address it we will need to review some of
the tenets of Relevance Theory (RT).

4

RT

It will be necessary to introduce a little of

RT's extensive terminology, in order for the
reader to be able to interpret literal
quotations from Sperber and Wilson (1986).
RT takes that people have thoughts,
i.e., conceptual representations (1986:3).
Among thoughts, a subclass are
assumptions, which are those thoughts
"treated by the individual as representations
of the actual world" (1986:2).
A context is thus defined as "a subset of the
hearer's assumptions about the world"
(1986:15). RT is interested in the notion of
context because it is the "set of premises
used in interpreting an utterance" (1986:15).
A fact is manifest if an individual
may be "capable ( ... ) of representing it
mentally and accepting its representation as
tme or probably tme" (1986:39). To be
noted is the claim that manifestness is not
equal to knowledge or assumption, which
are both stronger notions (i.e., something
may be manifest to me without it being
known or assumed tolby me, e.g., Julius
Caesar never had lunch with Napoleon).
The cognitive environment of an individual
is "the set of facts that are manifest to
him[/her]" (1986:39). Mutual manifestness
is defined simply as a (set of) facts that are

in the mutual cognitive environment
(1986:41).10
Coming now to communication,
Sperber and Wilson distinguish two
intentions within the communicative act:
Informative intention, i.e., the
intention to make manifest or more
manifest to the audience a set of
assumptions 1(1986:58)
Communicative intention, i.e., the
intention to make it mutually
manifest to [H and S] that the
communicator has this informative
intention (1986:61)
and on this basis define ostensive-inferential
communication as
the production by [S] of a stimulus
which makes it mutually manifest to [S
and H] that [S] intends, by means of this
stimulus, to make manifest or
more
manifest to [H] a set of assumptions [1]
(1986:63)
Ostensive communication is thus to be taken
as synonymous with communication, such
that it reveals its reflexive intention (cf.
1986:49).

5
RT and ARI-verbs
This creates a major problem in an RT
account of communication: since the
presumption of relevance is guaranteed only
to those utterances which include reflexive
intention (RI), it follows that if covert
communication ll does not include RI, it
cannot be governed by the principle of
relevance. This, of course, has the
counterintuitive consequence that if S were
to covertly communicate p, H could not
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draw any implications from the fact. In
other words, what would be covertly
communicated could only mean what it
literally means. 12 Thus, for example,
suppose that S covertly conveys to H the
assumption that S is tmstworthy, in the hope
that H will be swayed by this knowledge
into assigning S a given task requiring tmst.
S reasons that if H assumes that S is
tmstworthy, H will have a good reason to
assign to S the task. However, within an RT
framework, since H is, by definition, not
aware ofS's RI, it follows that H has no
reason to assume that this bit of information
is in any way relevant and, therefore, a
fortiori that H should base any decision on
this information.
Let us recall Tanaka's definition,
here repeated for the convenience of the
reader,
(15) A case of communication where the
intention of the speaker is to alter the
cognitive environment of the hearer,
i.e., to make a set of assumptions more
manifest to her, without making this
intention mutually manifest (1994:41).
Tanaka's way out of the problem is to claim
that "other stimuli can be used to overcome"
the absence of the "guarantee of optimal
relevance" (1994:41). Given that Tanaka's
work deals with advertising, she can claim
with a degree of plausibility that at least two
of these stimuli are sex and food (41).
Basically, her claim, which repeats Sperber
and Wilson's (1986:151-155), is that "the
cognitive system of human beings is
organized in such a way that it is more
susceptible to this kind of information [i.e.,
sex and food S.A.] that it is more susceptible
to this kind of information [i.e., sex and food
S.A.] than to other kinds" (54).
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While this author has been known to
enjoy both, he regretfully has to note that,
while there are certainly plenty of situations
in which H could use sex and food as
guidelines to establish the relevance of p,
there are bound to be many situations in
which S is not talking about sex and/or food,
nor are sex and/or food anywhere in the
relevant context. For example, one may
wish to covertly convey to a colleague that
his/her hour-long digression on his/her
dissertation topic is boring one to tears,
without necessarily offering him/her a
sandwich and/or sexual favors (although
presumably both would cause him/her to
stop speaking, at least briefly).
Leaving irony aside, no explanation
of the inferential process which has to rely
on the inherent "relevance" of stimuli can
hope to go beyond a naive mechanical
stimulus-response model. The power of
Grice's CP (and RT's relevance principle)
lies precisely in that it is a functional law
that does not have any substantive
"baggage."
To be fair to Tanaka, she does
broaden her scope with the claim that
"generally, covert communication
manipulates triggers to which the human
mind is highly susceptible" (1994:54).
However, the argument developed above
stands. It is doubtful that the fact that a
colleague's misguided ramblings about
his/her dissertation are boring is a "trigger to
which the human mind is highly
susceptible."
RT's account of covert
communication (or rather, "information
transmission," as communication
presupposes the RI) is based on the
assumption that covert communication is a
radically different mode of operation, in
which the CP/Re1evance is not available for
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inferencing. This is not an uncommon
stance; for example, Searle (1969) speaks of
"parasitic" modes (e.g., playacting) in
which the speech acts' felicity conditions are
not applicable.

6
There are no covert speech
acts
We will argue in what follows that the idea
of covert speech acts or covert
communication as envisioned above is, in
fact, in error. Or, to put it differently, there
are no covert speech acts, but only regular
overt speech acts which are performed
unfelicitously or otherwise inappropriately.
Consider that when S flatters H, S
wants H to think that S is sincerely
complimenting H for his/her achievements,
looks, etc. Should H get wind of S 's
ultimate intention, S's goal would fail. Note
that from H's point of view, ifS is
successful, a perfectly ordinary speech act
took place, and hence there is no need to
postulate anything beyond the regular
CP/relevance principle to guide H's
inferences. In other words, S's reflexive
intention applies to G, but to gl' i.e., to a
pretend, fallacious illocutionary goal, such
that (gl :::) G), or, informally, S intends H to
recognize the pretend intention to
communicate merely p, whereas S has other
goals.
In other words, if a covert speech act
succeeds, H has no knowledge of its
covertness, and hence from H's point of
view, an ordinary overt act took place.
From S's point of view, only the regular CP
may be postulated to be in effect, as H will
only have access to it. Let us consider what
happens if the covert speech act fails, i.e., H
realizes that S has an ulterior motive. From
S's point of view, no planning for that

possibility is possible, since it would entail
planning for one's intentions to fail (since S
does not want H to be aware of the covert
nature of the act)13. From H's point of view,
the situation is more complex, as he/she
must now take into account two goals that S
had in uttering the covert speech act, and the
fact that G included S's deceptive intention.
However, again, nothing in H's reasoning
requires anything but the assumption that S
would have expected H to use the CP to
draw inferences.
From what we have just said, it
follows that we need not postulate different
modes of communication, nor anything but
the regular CP to guide the inferential
processes of the speakers, provided we
admit that they do so to achieve goals which
may be conflicting and/or hidden to each
other.

6.1

Advantages

6.1.1 Simplicity
Basically, this explanation exempts us from
postulating a variety of modes of
communication and instead relies only on
the regular bonafide mode with the proviso
that the reflexive intention (and indeed any
other goal) of S may be different and, in
fact, opposed, in the case of lies, to the
communication of p.
6.12 Expandability
As the previous section implies, the
following reasoning may be extended to any
mode of communication (e.g., lies, play
acting, humor, etc.), since in covert
communication S has a goal G such that
there is a gil' which is the utterance of u
(where p is the proposition expressed in u);
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and there is a gp which is the reflexive
intention that H believe that S wants H to
know of gn. Obviously, nothing in the above
formulation guarantee to H that (gn n gr) ~
G 14 ; in fact, gn may merely be a decoy for
S's covert goals (flattering, deceiving,
persuading, amusing, entertaining, etc.) As
the list shows, this reasoning may be easily
extended to covert speech acts, advertising,
joke telling, playacting, etc.

7

Conclusion

We started out by defining a class of speech
acts which have as one of their felicity
conditions that the hearer not be aware of
the speaker's intention to achieve the speech
act in question. The implications of our
definition for the intentionality-based
theories of meaning and, in particular, for
Grice's MeaningNN and Relevance Theory
(RT), turned out to be momentous. While
the MeaningNN and Relevance Theory
(RT), turned out to be momentous. While
the MeaningNN may be salvaged by the
consideration that covert speech acts
implicate their meaning, such an escape is
impossible in the case of relevance-theoretic
accounts, which build in the reflexive
intention in their definition of implicature.
This conclusion led us to consider
the possibility that the whole concept of
covert communication, or of covert speech
acts as a distinct category, is to be rejected,
where we define "distinct" as operating in a
different mode of communication, either
governed by a different CP or not so
governed. In its place, it is argued that a
simpler approach needs only to postulate the
CP and admit that the speakers' goals in the
interaction, broadly construed, may differ
and be hidden from one another. The
advantages of such an approach are found to
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lie in its simplicity and in its expandability
to other phenomena.
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End Notes
lp can be taken to be a proposition, as is
standard usage (although we may not wish
to claim that all knowledge is propositional).
Alternatively, one could take p as a bit of
knowledge that S or H have.
2This is probably an oversimplification, but
likely a benign one. Note that the claim is
that G is a set of the union of its sub goal
sets, i.e., gj u gk u gk E G.
3This is not to say that H will believe p. It is
perfectly possible that S hints at something,
and H understands the hint but does not
believe what has been hinted. For example,
S may hint at having been abducted by
aliens, and S's H would (rightfully) discount
this belief.
4"Something bad" is shorthand for "an event
E may take place, such that Swould
evaluate/judge E as falling on the negative
side of a euphoric/dysphoric scale." The
abbreviation in the text justifies itself.
sThe text is worth quoting in the original:
quando si dice una frase per adulare 10
scopo direttamente espresso e dare una
qualche valutazione positiva
dell'ascoltatore, mentre il sovrascopo e
ottenere dei vantaggi dall'ascoltatore.
Tuttavia l'ascoltatore non deve scoprire
tale sovrascopo. Difatti, se 10 scopre,
tale sovrascopo non sara pili raggiunto,
cioe I vantaggi non saranno pili ottenuti
(Catelfranchi and Parisi 1980:328)
(When one says a sentence t 0 adulate, the
goal directly expressed is to give a positive
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evaluation of the hearer, while the supergoal
is to gain benefits from the hearer.
However, the hearer must not discover this
supergoal. Indeed, ifhe/she discovers it,
this supergoal will no longer be achieved,
i.e., the benefits will no longer be gained.)
6Needless to say, the above is probably a
failure to communicate, due to different
rhetorical styles. The interpretation in the
text is, however, vastly more entertaining.
7It should be noted that the cheesy line "Are
you trying to seduce me?" spoken by a
dazzled victim can be answered in the
positive only because in some cultural
niches "reprehensible" behavior is
considered seductive.
8Note that in the case in which p = q, then
trivially p ::J q, which corresponds to the
Coleman and Kay definition, in which S
states p. Some have distinguished between
lying and misleading, cf. Davis (1988:6).
9In some cases only, mostly when Gs go
against some of the goals ofH.
10 Sperber and Wilson make much of their
rejection of the concept of mutual
knowledge, first introduced (Strawson 1964)
to handle the problem presented by the fact
that the reflexive intention of S must
beknown to H, this latter fact must be
known to S, etc., ad infinitum. Their main
objection to mutual knowledge is precisely
that it is psychologically implausible, since
it requires the postulation of an infinity of
known facts. Sperber and Wilson replace
the notion of mutual knowledge with that of
mutual manifestness.
However, some recent lines of
argument have made the substitution more
or less moot. Clark (1996:92-100) has
argued convincingly that the infinite
regression of mutual knowledge is not
pernicious, as Sperber and Wilson (and
everybody else) thought. Searle, who in
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1969 had coined the term "reflexive
intention," has more recently (1998) argued
for the dismissal of the issue of mutual
knowledge on the basis of the claim that
mutual konwledge consists of a proposition
having the form We know that p, which of
course removes the problem created by the
cascade of "I-know-that-p"s. Furthermore,
several critics ofRT have voiced the
objection that manifestness and knowledge
are mere notational variants (cf. Talbot 1994
for a discussion)
"Consider the following remark -[ostensive] communication should be
distinguished from covert forms of
information transmission (Sperber and
Wilson 1986:30)
-- which makes it clear that R T assumes that
S may convey information covertly.
12Actually, not even that. Increasingly,
pragmatic accounts are reclaiming some 0
the space of semantics. The interface
between the two fields is increasingly hard
to map (not that it has been easy histOlically,
let me add. The seminal paper is Carston
(1988), and see also Recanati (1993).
However, for the present discussion this
issue is not germane.
13Note that this is not to say that S may not
have contingency plans in case of the failure
of his/her intention, but only that these plans
cannot involve the intention for his/her
intention to fail, lest his/her planning be
contradictory.
140r, in other words, there is no guarantee
that H will be able to infer from gil and gr S' s
ultimate goal.

